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PUBLIC SCHOOLS-Handicapped Children-Pennsylvania's 180
Day Annual Limit on Public Education Violates the Education
for All Handicapped Children Act. Battle v. Pennsylvania, 629
F.2d 269 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3954 (U.S.
June 23, 1981).

In Battle v. Pennsylvania,I the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit held that Pennsylvania's 180 day annual limit
on public education deprived certain handicapped children of a free
appropriate public education, 2 designed to address their unique
needs, in violation of the Education for All Handicapped Children
Act of 1975. 3 Battle is the first case that significantly defines the
scope of a handicapped child's right to a free appropriate public education under the Act.
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania is a recipient of federal
assistance under the Education for All Handicapped Children Act.4
Pursuant to the Act, every state that elects to receive funding must
provide all handicapped children' between the ages of three and
twenty-one 6 with the right to a free appropriate public education.
Furthermore, the state must adopt detailed due process procedures
to enable handicapped children and their parents to assert that
right. Previously, Pennsylvania implemented an administrative
policy that set a limit of 180 days of public education per year for all
1.

629 F.2d 269 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3954 (U.S. June 23, 1981).

2. See notes 63-90 and accompanying text infra.
3. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1461 (1976 & Supp. 1980). Regulations published pursuant to the
Act are found in 45 C.F.R. §§ 121a.1-.754 (1980). See notes 39-60 and accompanying text

4.

For a description of the formula used to determine the amount of funding a state

may receive see 45 C.F.R.

§§

121a.700-.749 (1980).

5. The term "handicapped children" means "mentally retarded, hard of hearing, deaf,
speech impaired, visually handicapped, seriously emotionally disturbed, orthopedically impaired, or other health impaired children, or children with specific learning disabilities, who by
reason thereof require special education and related services." 20 U.S.C. § 1401(1) (1976).
The categories of handicap enumerated in the statutory definition are defined in 45 C.F.R.
§ 121a.5 (1980).

6. A state is required to provide education to its handicapped residents aged three, four,
five, eighteen, nineteen, twenty, or twenty-one only if the State provides an opportunity for
educational services to nonhandicapped students of the same age. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(B) (1976);
45 C.F.R. § 121a.122(c) (1980). Pennsylvania's compliance with this requirement is documented in PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, FISCAL YEAR 1980 ANNUAL PROGRAM PLAN UNDER PART B OF THE EDUCATION OF THE HANDICAPPED ACT AS AMENDED BY

PUBLIC LAW 94-142 (1980).
7. 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (1976); 45 C.F.R.

§§

121a.500.589 (1980).

students.' In 1978, three class action lawsuits, filed by five severely
handicapped children 9 against state and local education agencies' 0
were consolidated for trial in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania." Plaintiffs alleged that their constitutional and statutory rights' 2 were violated by Pennsylvania's 180
day rule because the severity of their handicaps caused them to suffer a "regression-recoupment syndrome" after long breaks in educational programming.' 3 These breaks were the result of the 180 day
8. The court of appeals found that the derivation of this policy was unclear. 629 F.2d at
274 n.6. Although their attention had been called to PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 15-1501 (Purdon
1962), that statute established 180 as the minimum number of days per year that are permitted.
The circuit court seemed satisfied, however, by the trial court's finding that the Pennsylvania
Department of Education had instructed its hearing examiners that they were "without authority to, and may not, order a special education program which is in excess of 180 days per year."
Armstrong v. Kline, 476 F. Supp. 583, 587 (E.D. Pa. 1979). The district court's findings of fact
were not disputed on appeal.
9. The plaintiff class was certified as the class of "[a]ll handicapped school aged persons
in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania who require or who may require a program of special
education and related services in excess of 180 days per year and the parents or guardians of
such persons." Armstrong v. Kline, 476 F. Supp. 583, 586 (E.D. Pa. 1979). District Justice
Newcomer, however, refined this definition of the plaintiff class in his opinion to include only
those children who "suffer from various handicapping conditions, but generally can be classified in two separate, occasionally overlapping, categories: severely and profoundly impaired
by mental retardation with other handicaps; and severely emotionally disturbed." Id at 588.
The definition of the class is a matter within the broad discretion of the district court. See
City of N.Y. v. International Pipe & Ceramics Corp., 410 F.2d 295, 298 (2d Cir. 1969) (trial
judge given greatest respect and broadest discretion in class action decisions). Nevertheless,
Judge Van Dusen delivered a concurring opinion to express his dissatisfaction with Judge
Newcomer's definition. He would redefine the class as
those school aged individuals who are severely emotionally disturbed or severely and
profoundly impaired and whose regression-recoupment syndrome is so severe that
the traditional summer vacation period occasioned by the 180 day policy brings their
overall progress for the year to a virtual standstill.
Battle v. Pennsylvania, 629 F.2d 269, 282 (3d Cir. 1980) (Van Dusen, J., concurring).
10. The suit was filed against the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, the Pennsylvania Department of Education, the State Secretary of Education, the local school district in which each
named plaintiff resides, and the superintendent of each district. 629 F.2d at 271.
11. Plaintiffs consolidated these actions for trial on their common injunctive and declaratory issues. Id.
12. Plaintiffs' claims were based upon the following: (I) Rehabilitation Act of 1976, 29
U.S.C. § 794 (1976 & Supp. II 1980); (2) Education for All Handicapped Children Act, 20
U.S.C. §§ 1401-1461 (1976 & Supp. 1980); (3) Pennsylvania Public School Code of 1949, 24
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 13-1371 to 13-1382 (Purdon 1962 & Supp. 1981); (4) 45 C.F.R.
§ 121a (1980); (5) 22 PA. CODE ch. 13 and 171; and (6) the due process and equal protection
clauses of the United States Constitution. The district court's opinion was based exclusively
on the Education for All Handicapped Children Act. The circuit court, therefore, limited its
review to the validity of the 180 day rule under the Act. 629 F.2d at 272.
13. Armstrong v. Kline, 476 F. Supp. 583, 597 (E.D. Pa. 1979). The particular characteristics of the plaintiff class in this case are highly relevant to the court's analysis. All five children are severely handicapped. The district court describes in great detail the relationship
between plaintiffs' handicaps and their educational programs. Id at 588-600. The ultimate
factual finding made by the district court regarding the plaintiff class is that they suffer a
"regression-recoupment syndrome." That term is used to refer to two separate processes experienced by the plaintiff children. First, after a break in the school term, plaintiffs lose the
ability to perform many skills that they learned during the previous term. That is regression.
Second, upon returning to school, plaintiffs require a much greater amount of time to regain
those lost skills than a nonhandicapped child. Nonhandicapped children usually recoup losses
within a few weeks. Id at 597. The effect of the syndrome is that plaintiff children progress

rule.' 4 The district court granted injunctive and declaratory relief to
the plaintiffs.
On appeal, the circuit court examined the scope and purpose of
the Education for All Handicapped Children Act to determine

whether Pennsylvania's 180 day policy could co-exist with the Act.' 5
An unanimous court 6 held that a state may not arbitrarily limit the
school year for handicapped students to 180 days, but may consider
fiscal and resource limitations in developing extended school year
programs. The court found error in the district court's reasoning and
maintained that states, not courts, are responsible for establishing

special education programs. 1
Traditionally, education has been regarded as a responsibility of
the state. 8 Numerous state constitutions guarantee basic education
rights to their citizens' 9 and nearly all states have enacted some form
of compulsory education law.2" Initially, however, the public school
system was developed to address only the average child. 2 ' Training
very little, if at all, from year to year. See Brief for Appellees Battle and Bernard at 3-8, Brief
for Appellees Armstrong at 2-6, Battle v. Pennsylvania, 629 F.2d 269 (3d Cir. 1980).
The district court rejected the defendants' claims that factors other than programming
breaks, including teacher incompetency, parental failure and the lack of functionality of the
skills taught, were the cause of regression, but found instead that all factors contribute. 476 F.
Supp. at 595.
14. Pennsylvania's 180 day rule requires that school districts provide a minimum of 180
days of public education per year. See note 8 supra. No handicapped child can be granted a
school year in excess of 180 days. In practice, Pennsylvania schools are traditionally in session
from September to June. This practice allows a summer vacation for all students of approximately two and one-half months.
15. 629 F.2d at 271.
16. Although each judge wrote a separate opinion, they unanimously agreed that Pennsylvania's 180 day rule should be invalidated. Justice Sloviter dissented only from the majority's rationale. See note 84 infra.
17. District Justice Newcomer had issued an injunction and remedial orders based upon
his reasons for invalidating the 180 day rule. The case came before the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals on interlocutory appeal. 629 F.2d at 271. The circuit court remanded the case for
further proceedings consistent with its rationale. Id. at 281. The effect of the remand was to
alter the criteria established by Justice Newcomer to identify handicapped children in need of
an extended school year. Id.
18. No single tradition in public education is more deeply rooted than local control
over the operation of schools; local autonomy has long been thought essential both to
the maintenance of community concern and support for public schools and to the
quality of educational process. Thus, in San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, we
observed that local control over the educational process affords citizens an opportunity to participate in decisionmaking, permits the structuring of school programs to
fit local needs, and encourages "experimentation, innovation and a healthy competition for educational excellence."
Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 741-42 (1974). See San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1, 42-43, 49-50 (1973); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968); Note, Enforcing
the Right to an "Appropriate" Education. The EducationforAll HandicappedChildren Act of
1975, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1103, 1109 (1979) [hereinafter cited as 92 HARV. L. REV.].
19. See F. WEINTRAUB, A. ABESON & D. BRADDOCK, STATE LAW AND EDUCATION OF
HANDICAPPED CHILDREN: ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS 11 (1971).

20. See Note, The Right ofHandicappedChildren to an Education.- The Phoenix of Rodriguez, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 519, 522 n.9 (1973).
21. See Motion of the National School Boards Ass'n and the State of Maine to File Brief
as Amici Curiae, Memorandum in Support of Motion for Leave to File Brief as Amici Curiae,
Brief of Amici Curiae, at 5, Battle v. Pennsylvania, 629 F.2d 269 (3d Cir. 1980).

to eat, speak, dress or toilet was not included in classroom curricula;
nor were special provisions made for children with physical disabilities.2 2 Since limited educational funding could not support accommodations for exceptional children,23 many states created exceptions
to compulsory attendance statutes to exclude from public education
those students who were unable to profit from classroom instruction."4 By 1971, only seven states had adopted mandatory education
legislation that included all handicapped children, but twenty-six
states had mandatory programs for one or more categories of handicaps.2 5
The plight of the handicapped child was first recognized in the
courts. In Brown v. BoardofEducation,26 the United States Supreme
Court held that if states provide the opportunity for an education,
that opportunity is a "right which must be made available to all on
equal terms.1 27 Brown formed the foundation for two landmark federal cases. The Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Citizens v.
Pennsylvania (PARC)28 and Mills v. Boardof Education29 decisions
represent the "genesis of the exceptional child's right to an appropriate education."30 Both holdings indicate that the exclusion of handicapped children from public education can be a denial of their
constitutional rights to equal protection and due process.3 '
22. See generally Note, The Education of All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, 10 U.
MICH. J. L. REF. 110, 118-20 (1976) [hereinafter cited as 10 U. MICH. J. L. REF.].
23. The term "exceptional children" is used interchangeably with the term "handicapped
child" to refer to "those children of school age who deviate from the average in physical,
mental, emotional or social characteristics to such an extent that they require special educational facilities or services and shall include all children in detention homes." "Gifted" children in Pennsylvania are also considered to be exceptional. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 13137 1(1) (Purdon Supp. 1981); 22 PA. CODE §§ 13.21-.23. See also Central York School Dist. v.
Commonwealth, 41 Pa. Commw. Ct. 383, 399 A.2d 167 (1979).
24. See F. WEINTRAUB, supra note 19, at 11-12. Accord, McMillan v. Board of Educ.,
430 F.2d 1145, 1149 (2d Cir. 1970) (states can constitutionally exclude all handicapped children from public schools).
25. See H.R. REP. No. 332, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 10, reprintedin [1975] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 1425; 10 U. MICH. J. L. REF., supra note 22, at 119.
26. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
27. Id at 493.
28. 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (three judge panel,) approved and adopted, 343 F.
Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (three judge panel.
29. 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).
30. Comment, The Exceptional Child's Right to an Appro ved Private School Program in
Pennsylvania: PracticeandProblems, 84 DICK. L. REV. 417, 418 (1980) [hereinafter cited as 84
DICK. L. REv.].
31. The PARC and Mills cases have received extensive scholarly treatment. See generally L. LIPPMAN & I. GOLDBERG, RIGHT To EDUCATION (1973); Haggerty & Sacks, Education
for the Handicapped- Towards a Deinition of an Appropriate Education, 50 TEMP. L.Q. 961
(1977); Herr, Retarded Children and The Law.- Enforcing the ConstitutionalRights of the Mentally Retarded, 23 SYRACUSE L. REV. 995 (1972); Schwartz, The Education of Handicapped
Children: Emerging Legal Doctriqes, 7 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 25 (1973); 84 DICK. L. REV.,
supra note 30; Comment, The HandicappedChildhas a Right to an Appropriate Education, 55
NEB. L. REV. 637 (1976); Comment, Toward a Legal Theory of the Right to Education of the
Mentally Retarded, 34 OHIO ST. L.J. 554 (1973); Comment, EducationalEqualityforthe Mentally Retarded, 23 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1141 (1972); Comment, The Right to Education.- A ConstituionalAnalysis, 44 U. CIN. L. REV. 796 (1975).

PARC was a class action lawsuit filed on behalf of all mentally
retarded children who had been excluded from public schools as
uneducable or untrainable. On the basis of unanimous expert testimony, the PARC court found that "all mentally retarded persons are

capable of benefiting from a program of education and training.

32

The three-judge federal court approved a consent decree requiring
public school officials to place each mentally retarded child in a free
public program of education, appropriate to the child's capacity. 3
The added significance of PA4RC is the court's recognition of the
need for procedural safeguards.34 The court ordered that full due
process protection must be afforded to all students before a school
may "label" a child "mentally retarded. 35
Several months later, in Mills, the principles articulated in
PARC were extended to all handicapped children. Relying on the
rationale of the Supreme Court in Brown, the Mills court found that
the District of Columbia had violated due process and equal protection by denying handicapped children access to publicly supported
education. 36 The court rejected the defendant school board's argument that the cost of providing an education to handicapped children would be prohibitive and recognized that the District of
Columbia's interest in educating the excluded children outweighed
its interest in preserving financial resources. 37 Nevertheless, the
court concluded that if sufficient funds were unavailable, any "available funds must be expended equitably in such a manner that no
32. 334 F. Supp. at 1259.
33. 343 F. Supp. at 307. See also Education ofthe Handicapped- Towards A,Defnition of
an Appropriate Education, 50 TEMP. L.Q.961 (1977).
34. 343 F. Supp. at 303-06.
35. The court discusses the ramifications of the label "mentally retarded" in detail. The
facts of PARC provide an excellent example of the effect of the label. Id at 293. A significant
finding of the court concerns the. role that the school plays in labeling children:
Experts agree that itis primarily the school which imposes the mentally-retarded
label and concomitant stigmatization upon children, either initially or later on
through a change in educational assignment. This follows from the fact that the
school constitutes the first social institution with which the child comes into contact.
Not only is the school the institution which normally imposes the stigma; sometimes, and perhaps quite often, a child is incorrectly labeled. A recent study of 378
educable mentally retarded students from 36 independent school districts. . . found
that "the diagnosis for 25% of the youngsters found in classes for the [educable mentally] retarded may be considered erroneous. An additional 43% may be questioned."
Id at 295. See also Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971) (a due process hearing
should be held before the state stigmatizes any citizen).
36. The court held that no handicapped child could be excluded from a regular public
school assignment unless the child was provided "(a) adequate alternative educational services
suited to the child's needs, which may include special education or tuition grants, and (b) a
constitutionally adequate prior hearing and periodic review of the child's status, progress, and
the adequacy of any educational alternative." 348 F. Supp. at 878. See 10 U. MICH. J. L.
REF., supra note 22, at 112.
The due process protections outlined in Mills went beyond those promulgated in PARC.
348 F. Supp. at 874-75. See 84 DICK. L. REV., supra note 30, at 420 n.13.
37. 348 F. Supp. at 876.

child is entirely excluded from a publicly-supported education consistent with his needs and ability to benefit therefrom."3 8
Following the lead of the judiciary, 39 Congress adopted the Education for All Handicapped Children Act in 1975.40 The primary
purpose of the Act was to offer financial assistance to the states to
enable them to provide education services for handicapped children.4 ' More importantly, the Act sought to "obviate the necessity
for parents to utilize the courts to gain equal educational opportunity
for their handicapped children."4 2
Although the Act does not attempt to dictate a substantive curricula for handicapped children, it does provide detailed guidelines
for services and resources that state and local agencies are required
to make available to assure each handicapped child an appropriate
education.4 3 The Act stipulates that each exceptional child should
receive special education and related services designed to meet his or
38. Id But see Mclnnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. I11.
1968), a d sub nom.
McGinnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969).
39. Some concern was raised regarding the scope and precedential value of PARC and
Mills. In San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), the Supreme Court held
that no fundamental right to education exists. That decision limited the forcefulness of the
PARC and Mills equal protection language, but commentators and courts have agreed that
Rodriguez does not preclude "a constitutional right to a certain minimum level of education as
opposed to a constitutional right to a particular level of education." Fialkowski v. Shapp, 405
F. Supp. 946, 951 (E.D. Pa. 1975). See, e.g., Inre G.H., 218 N.W.2d 441 (N.D. 1974); 84 DICK.
L. REV., supra note 30, at 421; 10 U. MICH. J. L. REF., supra note 22, at 113. But see, e.g.,
Sherer v. Waier, 457 F. Supp. 1039 (W.D. Mo. 1978); New York State Ass'n. for Retarded
Children, Inc. v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752 (E.D.N.Y. 1973).
40. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1461 (1976 & Supp. 1980). See generally Stafford, Educationfor
the Handicapped-A Senator's Perspective, 3 VT. L. REV. 71 (1978); 92 HARV. L. REV., supra
note 18.
41. S.REP. No. 94-168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 7-9, reprintedin [1975] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 1425, 1431-33.
Congress recognized the need for equal educational opportunity for the handicapped.
The statutory statement of purpose provides the following:
The Congress finds that:
(1)there are more than eight million handicapped children in the United States today;
(2) the special educational needs of such children are not being fully met;
(3) more than half of the handicapped children in the United States do not receive
appropriate educational services which would enable them to have full equality of
opportunity;
(7) developments in the training of teachers and in diagnostic and instructional procedures and methods have advanced to the point that, given appropriate funding,
state and local educational agencies can and will provide effective special education
and related services to meet the needs of handicapped children;
(8) state and local educational agencies have a responsibility to provide education for
all handicapped children, but present financial resources are inadequate to meet the
special educational needs of handicapped children; and
(9) it is in the national interest that the Federal Government assist state and local
efforts to provide programs to meet the educational needs of handicapped children in
order to assure equal protection of the law.
Pub. L. No. 91-230, § 601, 84 Stat. 125 (1970), as amended by Pub. L. No. 94-142, § 3(a), 89
Stat. 773 (1975). See generally 10 U. MICH. J.L. REF., supra note 22, at 118-28.
42. 84 DICK. L. REV., supra note 30, at 422. See notes 53-60 and accompanying text
infra.
43. 20 U.S.C. § 1401 (1976); 45 C.F.R. §§ 121a.500-.593 (1980).

her unique needs." Related services are defined as a number of specific supportive services such as transportation, speech pathology
and audiology, psychological services, physical and occupational
therapy, recreation, counseling services, and medical services for diagnostic or evaluative purposes. 5
Perhaps the most significant measure provided by the Act to assure handicapped children an appropriate education is the individualized educational program (IEP).46 The IEP is a description of the
child's special and related services, an evaulation of the student's
current level of educational performance and a listing of the child's
annual goals and the teacher's short and long-term instructional
objectives.47 The IEP is developed after a full evaulation of the
child's needs.4 8 A multidisciplinary team, consisting of the student's
44. The Act also requires that state procedures ensure handicapped children an opportunity to be educated with the nonhandicapped "to the maximum extent appropriate." 20
U.S.C. § 1412(5) (1976). This policy has been termed "mainstreaming" and was derived from
PARC For a history of mainstreaming and an analysis of its purpose, see 92 HARV. L. REV.,
supra note 18, at 1118-24. See also Connors & Connors, Children'sRights and Mainstreaming
of the Handicapped, in CHILDREN'S RIGHTS: CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES 67, 74-75 (P.

Vardin & I. Brody ed. 1979); Miller & Miller, The HandicappedChild's Civil Right as it Relates
to the 'Least Restrictive Environment" and Appropriate Mainstreaming, 54 IND. L.J. 1 (1978);
Stafford, Educationforthe Handicapped-A Senator's Perspective, 3 VT. L. REV. 71, 76 (1978).
Pennsylvania has implemented a "priority order of placement" designed to implement
mainstreaming. Each stage represents a group of possible educational placements in descending order of desirability. The priority levels are as follows:
(1) A regular class in a regular school with supporting services.
(2) A school district special education program in a regular school, including
homebound instruction.
(3) A school district special education program in a special facility.
(4) An intermediate unit program in a regular school.
(5) An intermediate unit program in a special facility.
(6) An approved private school program.
22 PA. CODE § 171.16(c). See West Chester Area School Dist. v. Commonwealth, 43 Pa.
Commw. Ct. 14, 401 A.2d 610 (1979); Weintraub & Abeson, Appropriate Educationfor All
HandicappedChildrena A Growing Issue, 23 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1037, 1039-41 (1972); 84 DICK.
L. REV., supra note 30, at 424-27.
45. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(17) (1976); 45 C.F.R. § 121a.13 (1980). The Office of Education,
which is the federal agency responsible for the implementation of the Act, explains in its rules
and regulations that the "list of related services is not exhaustive and may include other developmental, corrective or supportive services. . . if they are required to assist a handicapped
child to benefit from special education." 45 C.F.R. § 121a.13 comment (1980).
46. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(19) (1976). See generally 92 HARV. L. REv., supra note 18.
47. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401(19), 1412(4) and (6), 1414(a)(5) (1976); 45 C.F.R. §§ 121a.340-.349
(1980).
48. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(c) (1976); 45 C.F.R. §§ 121a.531-.532 (1980). The Act stipulates
that the parents of a handicapped child have a right to obtain an independent educational
evaluation of the child. This evaluation must be considered by the public agency in any decision made that concerns the provision of a free appropriate public education to the child. 20
U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1)(A) (1976); 45 C.F.R. § 121a.503 (1980). Federal regulations further provide:
A parent has the right to an independent educational evaluation at public expense if the parent disagrees with an evaluation obtained by the public agency. However, the public agency may initiate a hearing under § 121a.506 of this subpart to
show that its evaluation is appropriate. If the final decision is that the evaluation is
appropriate, the parent still has the right to an independent educational evaluation,
but not at public expense.
45 C.F.R. § 121a.503(b) (1980) (emphasis added). See MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 71B, § 3
(West Supp. 1980); 8 N.Y. EDUC. § 200.5(b)(2) (1978) (regulations promulgated by New

past and future teachers, school counselors, psychologists, and intermediate unit personnel,4 9 reviews the child's records to develop the
IEP.5 0 The proposed IEP is presented to the child's parents at an

IEP conference and they may approve the school district's program
or initiate due process procedures to remediate the portions of the
IEP that they believe are inappropriate .5 The statute requires agencies to hold annual multidisplinary team meetings to review and, if
appropriate, to revise each child's IEP.5 2
Individual states seeking assistance under the Act must develop
a detailed plan explaining the policies and procedures to be implemented by the state to ensure each handicapped child an appropriate
education. 3 The plan must evidence the state's adoption of due pro-

cess provisions enumerated in federal regulations.5 4 These provisions afford parents the right to notice when the school district
decides to alter the educational status of their exceptional child. 5 If
they disagree with the contemplated change, parents may initiate
due process procedures by requesting an administrative hearing5 6
York's Commissioner of Education). See also Comment, Educating New York's Handicapped
Children, 43 ALB. L. REv. 95, 112 (1978).
49. The term "intermediate educational unit" means any public authority, other
than a local educational agency, which is under the general supervision of a state
educational agency, which is established by state law for the purpose of providing
free public education on a regional basis, and which provides special education and
related services to handicapped children within that State.
20 U.S.C. § 1401(22) (1976). Pennsylvania, for example, has twenty-nine intermediate units
throughout the state. Their statutory duty is to provide, administer, and maintain "such additional classes or schools as are necessary or to otherwise provide for the proper education and
training for all exceptional children who are not enrolled in classes or schools maintained and
operated by school districts." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 13-1372(4) (Purdon Supp. 1981).
50. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401(19), 1412(2)(B)(4) & (6), 1414(a)(5) (1976); 45 C.F.R. § 121a.344
(1980).
51. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(5) (1976); 45 C.F.R. § 121a.345 (1980).
52. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(c) (1976); 45 C.F.R. § 121a.534 (1980).
53. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1232c(b), 1412, 1413 (1976); 45 C.F.R. §§ 121a.110-.114 (1980).
54. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(7) (1976); 45 C.F.R. § 121a.237 (1980). The procedural safeguards are enumerated at 45 C.F.R. §§ 121a.500-.593 (1980). For an excellent analysis of the
Pennsylvania due process safeguards afforded the plaintiff in Battle v. Pennsylvania, see 84
DICK. L. REV., supra note 30, at 424-28.
55. Federal regulations provide as follows:
Written notice . . . must be given to the parents of a handicapped child a reasonable time before the public agency:
(1) Proposes to initiate or chane the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child or the provision of a free appropriate public education to the child,
or
(2) Refuses to initiate or change the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child or the provision of a free appropriate public education to the child.
45 C.F.R. § 121a.504(a) (1980). The regulation further requires that parental consent be obtained before a public agency may conduct a preplacement evaluation or place a child in a
special education program. Id at § 121a.504(b).
56. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1)(c), (2) (1976); 45 C.F.R. §§ 121a.504-506 (1980). Any party to
a hearing has a right to: (1) be accompanied and advised by counsel; (2) present evidence and
confront, cross-examine, and compel the attendance of witnesses; (3) prohibit the introduction
of evidence at the hearing which has not been disclosed to that party at least five days before
the hearing; (4) obtain a verbatim record of the hearing; and (5) obtain written findings of fact.
Hearings may be open to the public upon the request of the parent. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(d)
(1976); 45 C.F.R. § 121a.508 (1980).

with their state educational agency.5 7 During the proceedings, parents are afforded an opportunity to inspect and review, with counsel,
all school records concerning their child's educational placement.58

Any party aggrieved by the findings or decision made pursuant to
the hearing has the right to bring a civil action in either state or
federal court.59 Compliance with the Act's due process provisions
are assured since each state plan is submitted to and approved by the
United States Commissioner of Education before the state qualifies
for assistance.6 °
6
Both the district and circuit courts in Battle v. Pennsylvania
determined that the validity of Pennsylvania's 180 day rule required

resolution of the conflict between the following factors: (1) the
meaning and scope of free appropriate public education under the
Act; (2) the unique needs of the plaintiff class; and (3) the inflexibil-

ity of Pennsylvania's 180 day rule.62 Nonetheless, each court invalidated Pennsylvania's rule on different grounds.
The district court examined the definition of free appropriate
public education prescribed in the Act:
The term "free appropriate public education" means special
education and relatedservices which (A) have been provided at
public expense, under public supervision and direction, and
57. The state educational agency may appoint an impartial hearing officer to preside over
the due process hearing. Any party aggrieved by the hearing officer's decision has a right to
appeal to the state educational agency. If there is an appeal, the state agency must conduct an
impartial review of the hearing. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(c), (d) (1976); 45 C.F.R. §§ 121a.507-.510
(1980). See H.R. REP. No. 94-664, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 49 reprinted in [1975] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1425.

58.

Federal regulations provide the following:
Each participating agency shall permit parents to inspect and review any education records relating to their children which are collected, maintained or used by the
agency under this part. The agency shall comply with a request without unnecessary
delay and before any meeting regarding an individualized education program or
hearing relating to the identification, evaluation, or placement of the child, and in no
case more than 45 days after the request has been made.
45 C.F.R. § 121a.562(a) (1980) (emphasis added). Parents have a right to request explanations
or interpretations of the records, to request copies of any records, and to have a representative
inspect and review the records. Id
59. 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (1976); 45 C.F.R. § 121a.511 (1980). InBattle, plaintiffs filed suit in
the federal district court before their due process rights had been exhausted. Defendants
moved for dismissal on the ground that the district court lacked jurisdiction. The district court
resolved the issue by acknowledging an exception to the exhaustion requirements because "[tjo
find otherwise, would be to impose . . . unnecessary and unjustified burden . . . where

prompt relief is often required. As defendants admit that Pennsylvania due process procedures would have been of no avail to the plaintiffs, the Court holds that named plaintiffs' and
the class's failure to exhaust state remedies does not bar this suit." Armstrong v. Kline, 476 F.
Supp. 583, 602 (E.D. Pa. 1979). See McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185 (1969); Howard S.
v. Friendswood Independent School Dist., 454 F. Supp. 624 (S.D. Tex. 1978); Fialkowski v.
Shapp, 405 F. Supp. 946 (E.D. Pa. 1975); 121 CONG. REc. 37416 (1975) (remarks of Sen.

Williams).
60. 20 U.S.C. § 1413(c) (1976); 45 C.F.R. § 121a.113 (1980).
61. 629 F.2d 269 (3d Cir. 1980). The court of appeals changed the order of plaintiffs'
names on appeal. The district court case is Armstrong v. Kline, 476 F. Supp. 583 (E.D. Pa.
1979).
62. 629 F.2d at 276. Armstrong v. Kline, 476 F. Supp. 583, 603 (E.D. Pa. 1979).

without charge, (B) meet the standards of the state educational
agency, (C) include an appropriate preschool, elementary, or secondary school education in the state involved, and (D) are pro-

vided in conformity with the individualized education program
required under this title.63

The court noted that the special education component of an appropriate education called for programs designed to meet the unique
needs of exceptional children. 64 According to the court, individual
needs could be determined only in light of the educational goals
mandated under the Act. 65 Judge Newcomer found substantial evidence in the legislative history66 of the Act to support his finding that
"the congressional intent was to provide for that education which
would leave these children, upon school's completion, as independent as possible from dependency on others, including the state,
within the limits of the handicapping condition. '67 The district court
ruled that Pennsylvania's 180 day rule violated the Act because it
prevented the plaintiffs from achieving a level of self-sufficiency that
would otherwise be obtainable if they were given an appropriate education.68
The Commonwealth raised three primary arguments on appeal.
First, it vehemently criticized the district court's finding of a goal of
63. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(18) (1976) (emphasis added).
64. Special education is defined as "specially designated instruction, at no cost to the
parents or guardians, to meet the unique needs of a handicapped child, including classroom
instruction, instruction in physical education, home instruction, and instruction in hospitals
and institutions." Id at § 1401(16) (emphasis added).
65. Armstrong v. Kline, 476 F. Supp. 583, 603 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
66. Id at 603-04. The Act was originally introduced as S. 3614 on May 16, 1972. It was
reintroduced in the 93rd Congress in January of 1974 as S. 6, the Education for All Handicapped Children Act, and again reintroduced in the 94th Congress in January of 1979. The
purpose of S. 6 was to ensure "maximum benefits" to the handicapped. S. REP. No. 94-168,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. 9, reprintedin [1975] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1425, 1433. That
sentiment was repeatedly articulated by congressmen and others who testified before a congressional subcommittee. Senator Williams reiterated what others had indicated: failure to
provide appropriate educational services for all handicapped children over the years has resulted in the expenditure of billions of public dollars to maintain handicapped persons as
"dependents in minimally acceptable lifestyles ....
Yet, providing appropriate educational
services now means that many of these individuals will be able to become a contributing part
of our society. They will not have to depend on subsistence payments from public funds." 121
CONG. REC. 19492 (1975). Senator Williams stated that the purpose and goal of the Act was to
allow handicapped persons to become "productive citizens, capable of contributing, and even
more, capable of self-respect and price which they so rightly deserve." Id at 37416.
67. Armstrong v. Kline, 476 F. Supp. 583, 604 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
68. Id at 603-04. See S. REP. No. 94-168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 9, reprintedin 11975] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1425, 1430-34. After consideration of the order proposed by plaintiffs and the objections raised by defendants, District Justice Newcomer ordered, in part, as
follows:
A handicapped student is entitled to an education program in excess of 180 days
per year if regression caused by an interruption in the educational programming,
together with the student's limited recoupment capacity, renders it impossible or unlikely that the student will attain the level of self-sufficiency and independence from
caretakers that the student would otherwise be expected to reach in view of his/her
handicapping condition.
Remedial Order #2, Armstrong v. Kline, 476 F. Supp. 583 (1979).

self-sufficiency for the plaintiff class.69 Appellant argued that the

court was acting beyond its scope of authority by requiring the state
to ensure that all exceptional children achieve their maximum potential. Furthermore, appellant asserted that the legislature simply in-

tended to provide an equal educational opportunity for the

handicapped.7" Second, citing Brown v. Boardof Education,7 appellant contended that the district court failed to recognize Congress'
intent to retain state authority to define educational goals.72 Finally,
the State asserted that the burden to educate handicapped students
in excess of 180 days per year would be financially insurmounta73
ble.
The court of appeals was responsive to all arguments raised by
appellant. The majority found that the lower court erred in focusing
on the legislative history of the Act to establish a goal of self-sufficiency for the plaintiff class. Rather, the appellate court examined
the Act's definition of free appropriate public education. 74 By requiring education programs designed to meet the handicapped
child's unique needs, the Act focused on special needs derived from
the difference between a handicapped and a nonhandicapped child.
"Thus," the court concluded, "the Act probably anticipates that,
where possible, educational objectives for the handicapped should
be set with reference to those objectives established for nonhandi69. See Brief of Appellant Scanlon at 17-28; Brief for Amicus Curiae, Pennsylvania
School Boards Ass'n, In Support of the Position of the Appellants, Battle v. Pennsylvania, 629
F.2d 269 (3d Cir. 1980). See also Peter W. v. San Francisco, 60 Cal. App. 3d 814, 131 Cal.
Rptr. 854 (1976); San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
70. One component of a free appropriate public education under the Act is the provision
of "related services." The Act requires that certain non-instructional services be provided to
the extent "required to assist a handicapped child to beneft from special education." 20
U.S.C. § 1401(17) (1976) (emphasis added).
71. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
72. See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(18)(B) (1976). See also Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 74142 (1974); San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 6 (1973); Wright v. Council of
the City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 469 (1972).
73. Robert Scanlon, Secretary of Education for the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, testified before the United States Senate Subcommittee on the Handicapped on October 3, 1979
concerning Pennsylvania's expenditures for handicapped children. Mr. Scanlon reported that
the State was spending $359.4 million in its educational efforts for handicapped children, with
only $45.3 million of that amount reimbursed by federal funds under the Act. Appellant estimated that the district court's ruling would increase expenditures by the Commonwealth between $200 million and $500 million per year. Appellant concluded that it could not meet
such a burden and that it would have to withdraw from participation under the Act. See Brief
of Amicus Curiae, Pennsylvania School Boards Ass'n, In Support of the Position of the Appellants, 629 F.2d 269 (3d Cir. 1980).
Courts have recognized that the parameters of governmental obligations created by statutes can often be defined by the funds appropriated by the Legislature to fulfill those obligations. In Dawson v. Casey, 484 Pa. 415, 399 A.2d 360 (1979), a school district argued that it
would be
had an obligation to provide only a certain level of services. The court held that "[ilt
unreasonable to conclude that a greater duty has been delegated than that which the Legislature, through the statutory funding scheme, has provided the school district the means to fulfill." Id at 424, 399 A.2d at 365. See also Brooks v. Dewar, 313 U.S. 354 (1941); Alaska S.S.
Co. v. United States, 290 U.S. 256 (1933).
74. 629 F.2d at 276.

capped."7 5 Consequently, this principle must be considered when

formulating individualized educational programs for the handicapped.7 6 When it attempted to propose standards, however, the
court encountered difficult problems both in selecting the standard
for comparison and in making the appropriate comparison."' The
court found that when children with severe handicaps are involved,

"this comparison reaches a level of difficulty which, in the absence of
legislative guidance, approaches the perimeter of judicial competence."'7 8
The Battle Court concluded that decisions of educational policy
are best left to state and local authorities,7 9 particularly in light of
limited financial resources.8" The Act stipulates that a free appropriate public education must meet the standards established by the state
educational agency 8 and that the responsibility for compliance with
the Act lies with the state.82 Moreover, although the Act allows for
parental input in the creation of IEP's, the final decision on the appropriate program for each child rests with the local educational
agency.8 3 The court concluded that the Act contemplates state autonomy in the determination of educational goals for its handicapped residents.8 4
75. Id at 277.
76. The court used the example of a blind or deaf child. Those children "may be expected to attain educational achievements commensurate with normal children upon the provision of special services, such as braille books or a sign language interpreter." Id See
generally Rowley v. Board of Educ., 632 F.2d 945 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
77. 629 F.2d at 277. See, e.g., Rowley v. Board of Educ., 632 F.2d 945 (S.D.N.Y. 1980);
92 HARV. L. REV. supra note 18, at 1125-27. Cf.45 C.F.R. § 84.33(b) (1980).
78. 629 F.2d at 277. Seegenerally 10 U. MICH. J. L. REF., supra note 22, at 130-35. The
Supreme Court stated in San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973),
[T]his case also involves the most persistent and difficult questions of educational
policy, another area in which this Court's lack of specialized knowledge and experience counsels against premature interference with the informed judgments made at
the state and local levels. Education, perhaps even more than welfare assistance,
presents a myriad of "interactable economic, social, and even philosophical
problems."
Id at 42 (quoting Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1979)). See Mclnnis v. Shapiro,
293 F. Supp. 327, 335-36 (N.D. IlI. 1968) (courts cannot provide intelligent educational planning).
79. 629 F.2d at 277-78. Accord, Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 741-42 (1974) (local
control over the operation of schools is deeply rooted in the traditions of public education);
San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 42-43, 49-50 (1973); Epeusan v. Arkansas,
393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968); 92 HARV. L. Rv., supra note 18, at 1109.
80. 629 F.2d at 278. Accord, Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 876 (D.D.C.
1972). Cf.Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970) (Constitution does not empower
second guessing on resource allocation). See generally 10 U. MICH. J. L. REF., supra note 22,
at 125-28.
81. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(18)(B) (1976).
82. Id at § 1412.
83. Id at § 1414(a)(5). Compare id § 1415(b) with id § 1415(c).
84. Judge Sloviter dissented from this portion of the majority's opinion. She would have
affirmed the district court's findings in their entirety. Judge Sloviter, however, would go further than the district court and find invalid any state policy that does not purport to effect great
self-sufficiency for handicapped children. See 629 F.2d at 283 (opinion of Sloviter, Circuit
Judge, concurring and dissenting in part).

Once it established that states are responsible for setting reasonable educational objectives and reasonable means to achieve those
objectives, the circuit court defined the perimeters of state author-

ity.85 Relying on specific provisions in the Act, the court found an
86

overriding emphasis on the unique needs of the individual child
signified by the requirement of an IEP. 87 The court of appeals concluded that the validity of a state educational mandate should be
88

considered in light of its effect upon the concept of individualism.

An enactment that impedes the formulation of an educational program based upon the unique needs of the individual student violates
the Act.8 9
Hence, the central issue in Battle was narrowed to whether
Pennsylvania's inflexible 180 day rule impeded the formulation of
individualized educational programs based upon the unique needs
of the student. The Third Circuit ruled that it did and maintained
that "[rlather than ascertaining the reasonable educational needs of
each child in light of reasonable educational goals, and establishing
a reasonable program to attain those goals, the 180 day rule imposes
with rigid certainty a program restricton which may be wholly inappropriate to the child's educational objectives." 90
The significance of Battle is its emphasis on the individual.
There has been sparse litigation in the courts pursuant to the Act, but
the majority of decisions concern disputes between parents and
school authorities over what constitutes an appropriate educational
placement. 9' The Battle rationale will narrow the issues in future
85. 629 F.2d at 279.
86. "First, the Act provides for persuasive federal oversight by the Commissioner of Education. Second, the Act sets forth explicitly detailed procedures to assure that the states will
properly exercise their responsibility to provide 'free appropriate public education."' Id
87. Id See also Lora v. Board of Educ., 456 F. Supp. 1211, 1227 (E.D.N.Y. 1978). See
generaly 92 HARV. L. REV., supra note 18, at 137-51.
88. "The emphasis on the individual is necessary in light of the wide variety of the handicapping conditions covered by the Act." 629 F.2d at 280.
89. "As difficult as it is to define the scope of the 'unique needs' which must be met by
special education. . . there can be little doubt that by requiring attention to 'unique needs,'
the Act demands that special education be tailored to the individual." Id
90. Id
91. See, e.g., Tatro v. Texas, 625 F.2d 557 (5th Cir. 1980) (school did not make provisions
for child's urinary problems); Adashunas v. Negley, 626 F.2d 600 (7th Cir. 1980) (learning
disabled child not identified); Rowley v. Board of Educ., 632 F.2d 945 (2d Cir. 1980) (court
ordered that a sign language interpreter be provided for a deaf student); Harris v. Campbell,
472 F. Supp. 51 (E.D. Va. 1979) (action by mother after extensive efforts by school district to
find appropriate placement for emotionally disturbed child failed); North v. District of Columbia Bd. of Educ., 471 F. Supp. 136 (D.D.C. 1979) (suit brought after education and welfare
agencies each disclaimed responsibility for placement of multiple-handicapped boy); Loughran v. Flanders, 470 F. Supp. 110 (D. Conn. 1979) (suit brought after alleged failure of school
district to diagnose and take steps to remedy condition of learning disabled child); Boxall v.
Sequoia Union High School Dist., 464 F. Supp. 1104 (N.D. Cal. 1979) (autistic child denied
full-time tutor in his home by school district); Stemple v. Board of Educ., 464 F. Supp. 258 (D.
Sept. 19, 1978) (placement of physiMd. 1979); Pecunas v. Kline, No. 78-3133 (E.D. Pa., filed
cally handicapped boy of normal intelligence in regular classroom contested by school district). See generally 84 DICK. L. REV., supra note 30.

hearings and trials to the question of what is appropriate for the student's unique needs.9 2
The Battle decision does not, however, resolve the financial
problems created by the placement procedure. The education of
handicapped children is expensive. Generally, it costs twice as much
to educate a handicapped child as it does to educate a nonhandicapped student.93 "Tuition ceilings remain in effect and impact most
severely on those whose financial need is greatest."9 Although the
Battle court's deference to state fiscal concerns limits the impact of
the decision's emphasis on the individual, handicapped childrens'
victory in Battle is sound precedeat for future interpretation of free
appropriate public education.9 5

92. It is conceivable that a mildly mentally retarded plaintiff will be able to prove that an
extended school year is appropriate to meet his unique needs.
93. 121 CONG. REc. 23705 (1975). See generally Motion of the National School Boards
Ass'n and the State of Maine to File Brief as Amici Curiae, Memorandum in Support of
Motion for Leave to File Brief as Amici Curiae, Brief of Amici Curiae, 629 F.2d 269 (3d Cir.
1980).
94. 84 DICK. L. REv., supra note 30, at 441.
95. One commentator has observed that, in practice, school districts tend to develop individualized educational programs based on existing resources available rather than on the
needs of the child. School officials then "encourage" parents to accept the proposed programs.
See id at 422-23. But see Lora v. Board of Educ., 456 F. Supp. 1211, 1293 (E.D.N.Y. 1978);
Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 876 (D.D.C. 1972).
[Casenote by Stuart A. Law]

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Free Press/Fair Trial-Pretrial Suppression Hearing May Not Be Closed To Public When Other
Available Procedures Will Adequately Protect Defendant's
Right to a Fair Trial. Commonwealth v. Hayes, 489 Pa. 419, 414
A.2d 318, cert. denied, 101 S.Ct. 528 (1980).

In Commonwealth v. Hayes,' a divided 2 Pennsylvania Supreme
Court held that a pretrial hearing could not be closed to the public
when some other available procedural device can fully protect defendant's right to a fair trial. Because Hayes' right to an impartial
jury could be adequately protected by sequestration, the trial judge
was without justification to exclude the public from defendant's suppression hearing and, thus, the closure order was reversed. By incorporating a mandatory consideration of alternative procedures into
rulings on closure of pretrial hearings, Commonwealth v. Hayes imparts a significant influence on the access of the public and press to
Pennsylvania courtrooms.
The defendant in Hayes was a former Pennsylvania state legislator who was charged with sexually assaulting and supplying drugs
to a seventeen year old male. At a suppression hearing scheduled to
commence immediately prior to his trial, Hayes made a motion to
close the hearing.3 The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania concurred
in the closure, and the trial judge ordered the hearing closed to the
public.
A representative of the PittsburghPress, permitted to intervene
in the Hayes case, objected to the closure order. The trial judge denied the Press' motion for an open hearing, and also rejected the
suggestion that prejudice to defendant could be avoided by impaneling and sequestering a jury prior to the suppression hearing. The
1. 489 Pa. 419, 414 A.2d 318, cert. denied, 101 S.Ct. 528 (1980).
2. Justice Nix wrote the opinion stating the holding of the court. Justices Larsen, Flaherty and Kauffman all entered concurring opinions. Justice Roberts wrote a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice Eagen and Justice O'Brien joined.
3. Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 323(f) allows a hearing to be closed on the
motion of the defendant.
The hearing, either before or at trial, shall be held in open court unless defendant
moves that it be held only in the presence of the defendant, counsel for the parties,
court officers and necessary witnesses. If the hearing is held after the jury has been
sworn, it shall be held outside the hearing and presence of the jury. In all cases the
court may make such order concerning publicity of the proceedings as it deems appropriate under Rules 326 and 327.
42 PA. Co s. STAT. ANN. § 323(f) (Purdon Supp. 1981). For a further discussion, see notes 5361 and accompanying text infra.

suppression hearing was then postponed to allow the Press to seek

review of the closure order by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
The Press obtained a stay from Justice O'Brien and filed a petition
for extraordinary jurisdiction4 and summary reversal of the closure
order. 5
Commonwealth v. Hayes "represents yet another dispute in the
continuing controversy between 'free press' and 'fair trial.'"6 The
controversy emanates from the constitutional tension created by
claims of a public right of access to all criminal proceedings 7 and
assertions by criminal defendants that the widespread publicity created by open hearings abrogates their right to a fair trial.' The argument that prejudicial publicity can impair the fairness of a
defendant's trial is not new, 9 yet there has been a surge of litigation
connected with this issue in recent years.' 0
A defendant in a criminal prosecution has a constitutional right

to be tried by an impartial jury."I It has been firmly established that
4. The Pennsylvania Rule outlining the extraordinary jurisdiction of the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court provides:
Notwithstanding any other provisions of law, the Supreme Court may, on its own
motion or upon petition of any party, in any matter pending before any court or
justice of the peace of this Commonwealth involving an issue of immediate public
importance, assume plenary jurisdiction of such matter at any stage thereof and enter
a fnal order or otherwise cause right and justice to be done.
42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 726 (Purdon Supp. 1981). For a discussion of the issues raised by
the use of this petition and the questions regarding its appropriateness, see notes 45-47 and
accompanying text infra.
5. In addition to the PittsburghPress, the Court allowed the Tribune-Review Publishing
Co., WTAE-TV, the Post-Gazette Publishing Co., and the First Amendment Coalition to intervene. 489 Pa. at 421, 414 A.2d at 319.
6. Id at 420, 414 A.2d at 318.
7. U.S. CoNsTr. amend. I provides: "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the
" The United States Supreme Court has held the right to be
freedom of ... the press ..
applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S.
652 (1925).
8. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
The sixth amendment has been held
wherein the crime shall have been committed ....
applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment. See In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133

(1955).
9. See United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 49 (C.C. Va. 1807), in which the defense attorney contended that adverse publicity had prejudiced the jury against defendant Aaron Burr.
10. See Stephenson, Fair Trial-FreePress.- Issues in Continuing Conflict, 46 BROOKLYN
L. REV. 39, 4041 (1975). Stephenson contends that the recent increase in litigation can be
partially explained by the Warren Court's expanded recognition of defendant's sixth amendment rights.
In addition, media challenges to court orders rose sharply as courts increasingly turned to
restrictions on the press and public as a means of securing a fair trial. Id The trend is attributable to a heightened emphasis on the trial judge's duty to protect the accused. See Sheppard
v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966) and note 19 and accompanying text infra. See also Landau,
FairTrial and FreePress." A Due Process Proposal The Challenge of the Communication Media, 62 A.B.A.J. 55, 57 (1976); Schmidt and Volner, Nebraska PressAssociation." An Open or
Shut Decision?, 29 STAN. L. REV. 529, 529-30 (1977); Comment, Exclusion of the Press and
Publicfrom Pre-trialCriminalProceedingsto GuaranteeFairTrial, 25 WAYNE L. REV. 883, 884
(1979) [hereinafter cited as 25 WAYNE L. REV.].
See note 8 supra.
11.

prejudicial publicity may negate the impartiality of a jury and encroach on defendant's fair trial rights. In Irwin v. Dowd,12 the

United States Supreme Court first held a state conviction constitutionally invalid on the ground that publicity surrounding the trial
3

had made it impossible for the jury to render an impartial verdict.'

Furthermore, the Supreme Court has recognized that media cover-

age of a criminal trial is an influential source of adverse publicity,
and that the presence of the press can disrupt the proper functioning
of judicial proceedings. 4 In Estes v. Texas, 11 the Court concluded
that the presence of television cameras within the courtroom violated
due process and vitiated defendant's right to a fair trial. 6
Perhaps the most significant case recognizing the adverse effects
of the media on judicial proceedings is Sheppard v. Mfaxwell, 17 in

which the Court found that the unabated buildup of prejudicial publicity and the "carnival atmosphere"' 8 of the trial had eliminated

any possibility of a fair trial. The importance of Sheppard is the
Court's conclusion that the presence and conduct of the press at a
trial can be limited if the rights of the accused are threatened.' 9
Sheppard places an affirmative duty on trial judges to protect the
accused and preserve the fairness of the trial by curtailing the poten20
tially harmful effects of prejudicial publicity.

The Supreme Court, however, has been careful to emphasize

the vital position the press occupies in ensuring that the judicial system functions properly. Media coverage of judicial proceedings provides a means for the public to scrutinize the administration of
justice.2 Thus, the interests of free press are not subjugated to de12. 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
13. The court found that a high degree of prejudice against the defendant existed in the
community. Ninety percent of the jury panel and eight of the jurors ultimately selected believed that defendant was guilty before the trial commenced. Id at 727.
14. See, e.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966), Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S.
723 (1963); Irwin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
15. 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
16. Portions of defendant's trial and pretrial hearings were televised live. Id at 537. The
Court stated that "the life or liberty of any individual in this land should not be put in jeopardy because of the actions of any news media." Id at 540.
17. 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
18. Id at 358. Defendant's murder trial received an inordinate amount of public attention. Newspaper accounts published information concerning the murder, substantial portions
of which were false and never presented at trial; a three-day coroner's inquest was broadcast
live; defendant was subjected to five and one-half hours of questioning in front of reporters;
and members of the media constantly disrupted the court proceedings by freely walking in and
out of the courtroom. Id at 335-49.
19. Id at 358.
20. See 25 WAYNE L. REV., supra note 10, at 884; Comment, The Right to AttendPre-trial
Criminal Proceedings. Free Press,Fair Trial, and Prioritiesin Curbing Pre-Trial Publicity, 28
SYRACUSE L. REV. 875 (1977) [hereinafter cited as 28 SYRACUSE L. REV.].
21. The valuable role of the press has been characterized by the United States Supreme
Court as follows:
A responsible press has always been regarded as the handmaiden of effective judicial
administration, especially in the criminal field. Its function in this regard is docu-

fendant's right to a fair trial in every case. For example, in Nebraska
PressAssociation v. Stuart,2 2 the trial court issued an order prohibit-

ing members of the press from publishing information and statements they had obtained prior to the trial. The Supreme Court
reversed the order and characterized the prior restraint as the "most
severe and least tolerable infringement on First Amendment
rights."2 3 An order restraining publication of information already
gathered is presumptively unconstitutional and cannot be issued unless less drastic means are unavailable and prior restraint is absolutely necessary for the protection of defendant's rights.24 Although
Nebraska Press made it clear that trial judges were severely restricted in limiting the press' right to publication once a proceeding
was open to the public,2 5 the case did not resolve the issue of judicially barring the press and public from the proceedings.
The closing of pretrial hearings has long been a practice of trial
judges,2 6 who have increasingly used closure orders.2 7 Yet, it was
28 that the Supreme Court
not until Gannett Co. v. Depasquale
squarely faced the issue of whether there was an independent constitutional right to access that prohibited the closing of criminal proceedings. In Gannett, a suppression hearing2 9 was closed on
defendant's motion and without objection by the district attorney.3 °
mented by an impressive record of service over several centuries. The press does not
simply publish information about trials, but guards against the miscarriage ofjustice
by subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism.
Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. at 350. See also Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 427 U.S.
539, 586-87 (1975).
22. 427 U.S. 539 (1975).
23. Id at 559. For an article outlining the use of prior restraints and tracing the develoment of recent case law, see Rendleman, Free Press-FairTrial- Restrictive Orders after Nebraska Press, 67 KENT L.J. 867 (1979).
24. 427 U.S. at 563-67. Consideration of the alternatives mentioned in Nebraska Press is
a crucial element of the decision in Commonwealth v. Hayes and a point of major contention
among the members of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. See notes 64, 78 & 79 infra.
25. See also Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court, 430 U.S. 308 (1977) (court improperly prohibited publication of a juvenile's name and photo that the press had obtained).
26. The New York Field Code of Criminal Procedure, published in 1850 and uniformly
followed by other states, permitted the closing of pretrial hearings. See COMMISSIONERS ON
PRACTICE AND PLEADINGS, CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURES § 202 (Final Report, 1850).
27. See ABA LEGAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS, REVISED
DRAFT RECOMMENDED COURT PROCEDURE TO ACCOMMODATE RIGHTS OF FAIR TRIAL AND

FREE PRESS 57 (Nov. 1975).
28. 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
29. The problems raised by the effects of adverse publicity are especially acute in suppression hearings since, in addition to the threat of creating prejudice against defendant, the
possibility exists that evidence excluded from the trial will be made public and become part of

the jury's determination.
30. The district attorney's failure to object to the closing was crucial to the Gannett decision. The opinion states that "although a defendant can, under some circumstances, waive his
constitutional right to a public trial, he has no absolute right to compel a private trial." 443
U.S. at 382 n.11 (citing Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 35 (1964)). Thus, without the
right to compel a private trial, itis doubtful that a defendant's motion for closure would prevail over the government's objection. See Note, The Right ofAccess to a CriminalCourtroom."

Gannett Co. v. Desquale, 51 COLO. L. REV. 425, 427-30 (1980).

The Court held that a closure order did not violate any constitutional right of the press or public if the prosecution and trial judge

agreed that adverse publicity jeopardized defendant's right to a fair
trial.3 ' The Gannett court dealt at length with the sixth amendment
and concluded that it was not intended to grant to the public an
independent right of access. 32 Even if such a constitutional right of
public access could be found in the sixth amendment, this right did
not extend to pretrial proceedings, such as the suppression hearing in
Gannett.33
Gannett did not decide whether a constitutional right to access is
guaranteed by the first amendment. Justice Stewart stated that if
such a guarantee is found in the first amendment, the right is "given
all appropriate deference by the state nisi prius court in the present
case." 34 The state court in Gannett had acted properly in balancing
the press' constitutional rights against defendant's right to a fair trial
and in determining that an open proceeding would pose a "reasonable probability of prejudice to these defendants. ' 35 Thus, the trial
judge was entitled to order the suppression hearing closed without
violating any rights of the press or public.3 6
The members of the Gannett court disagreed on the proper standard available to trial judges to determine the appropriateness of
closure orders, as well as on the extent of the protection offered
under the right of access. In contrast to Justice Stewart's deference
31. Again, the district attorney's concurrence seems crucial to the Court's decision. See
note 30 supra. Justice Stewart's majority opinion takes the position that "the public's interest
in the administration of justice is protected by the participants of the litigation," 443 U.S. at
383, and that the district attorney's responsibility as a representative of the public "encompasses a duty to protect the societal interest in an open trial," id at 383 n. 12.
32. 443 U.S. at 379. Justice Stewart's majority opinion phrased the issue in terms of
whether the public had an independent constitutional right to access. Justice Blackmun's dissent, however, stated that the issue was whether an accused has the right to demand a public
trial. In finding that the defendant did not have such a right, Justice Blackmun did state that a
right of access existed in the sixth amendment's guarantee of a public trial. See id at 411-39
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). See also United States v. Cianfrani, 573 F.2d 835 (3d Cir. 1978).
33. 443 U.S. at 387-91.
34. Id at 392. Justice Powell, in his concurring opinion, explicitly held that members of
the press have an access right guaranteed by the first and fourteenth amendments. Powell
based his position on his dissent in Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974), in
which he maintained that the press enjoys constitutional protection, not because of any special
status as members of the media, but because "in seeking out the news, the press ... acts as an
agent of the public at large." Id at 863. Justice Rehnquist did not find a guaranteed right of
access under the first or sixth amendments. Similarly, Chief Justice Burger found no right in
the sixth amendment, but reserved comment on the first amendment.
35. 443 U.S. at 392-93.
36. It is unclear whether Justice Stewart's description of the balancing process and reasonable probability of prejudice standard, employed by the trial judge in Gannett, is to be
considered the proper standard for determining the appropriateness of a hearing closure.
Stewart narrowly construed the standard and stated that the Gannett opinion does not declare
"whether there would be a constitutional barrier to a state law that imposed a stricter standard
of closure than the one here employed by the New York courts." Id at 394.
For a criticism of this standard, see Comment, The Right to Attend CriminalHearings, 78
COLUM. L. REV. 1308, 1313 (1978).

to the balancing test applied by the Gannett trial court, Justices Powell and Blackmun elaborated specific standards and burdens of proof
to resolve the conflicting interests.37
Justice Powell, in his concurring opinion, maintained that it was
incumbent upon trial courts to consider whether alternatives to closure could adequately protect the defendant's right to a fair trial, and
whether all parties had been given an opportunity to be heard.38
Consequently, it was the defendant's responsibility to show that
prejudice was likely to occur, and the press carried the burden of
showing the adequacy of alternative procedures.39
Justice Blackmun's dissenting opinion advocated a stricter standard, permitting closure only when "strictly and inescapably necessary""a to the preservation of a fair trial. The defendant, upon
making a motion for closure, must show a substantial probability
that prejudice will occur and that closure can prevent the harm. Defendant also carries the burden of showing that alternative procedures are inadequate."
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court dealt with the issue of closure
orders and pretrial hearings in PhiladelphiaNewspapers, Inc. v. Jerome,4 2 in which suppression hearings were ordered closed to the
public. The case reached the state supreme court after the consolidation of challenges to the constitutionality of the Pennsylvania Rules
of Criminal Procedure, under which the closures were ordered.43
37. Justice Rehnquist, who found no right of access guaranteed by the first or sixth
amendments, explained that lower courts are "free to determine for themselves the question
whether to open or close the proceeding." 443 U.S. at 405.
38. The priority of alternatives is a focal issue of the free press/fair trial controversy.
The trial court in Gannett failed to consider any alternatives to closure. Furthermore, the
Gannett decision is unclear since the Court in Nebraska Press had admonished the trial court
for not considering alternatives to the issuance of a prior restraint. See Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 427 U.S. at 563-5 and note 24 and accompanying text supra. In Justice Cook's
dissent in the Gannett case at the New York appellate level, he states that Nebraska Press
mandates that alternatives be considered. Gannett Co. v. Depasquale, 55 App. Div. 2d 107,
387 N.Y.S.2d 719 (1976), modified, 43 N.Y.2d 370, 372 N.E.2d 544, 401 N.Y.S.2d 756 (1977).
The American Bar Association Adjunct Committee on Fair Trial and Free Press has advocated the consideration of alternative procedures.
The presiding officer may close a preliminary hearing . . .including a motion to
suppress. . . if: (i) the dissemination of information from the pre-trial proceeding
would create a clear and present danger to the fairness of the trial, and (ii) the prejudicial effect of such information on trial fairness cannot be avoided by any reasonable
alternatisemeans.
ABA COMM. ON FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS (1970) (emphasis added).
39. Gannett Co. v. Depasquale, 443 U.S. at 400-02 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell found that the trial court in Gannett had applied a standard similar to the one he presented,
even though it is clear that alternatives were not considered.
40. Id at 440 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
41. Id at 440-46.
42. 478 Pa. 484, 387 A.2d 425, appeal dismissed, 443 U.S. 913 (1978).
43. PA. RULES OF CRIM. PRoc. 323(0, 326 & 327. See note 3 supra.
PA. R. CRIM. P. 326 provides:

In a widely-publicized or sensational case, the Court, on motion of either party or on
its own motion, may issue a special order governing such matter as extrajudicial
statements by parties and witnesses likely to interfere with the rights of the accused to

The media organizations in Jerome petitioned the court for the extraordinary relief of prohibition and mandamus, both of which were
denied.
The two questions the Jerome court addressed were whether petitioners were entitled to the extraordinary relief they requested and
whether the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure sufficiently
protected both defendant's right to a fair trial and the public's interest in an open hearing. Answers to both questions, however, were
contingent on whether the public has an interest in or a right of access to criminal proceedings.'
Because the court "will not invoke extraordinary jurisdiction
unless the record clearly demonstrates a petitioner's rights, '4 5 petitioners had to show that a clear right existed and that the right was
being denied by the trial court's closure order. Without dealing at
length with petitioner's claims that a public right to access was constitutionally guaranteed, the court decided that petitioners had failed
to demonstrate the denial of a clear right. The Jerome court acknowledged the public's strong interest in the judicial process and
recognized the United States Supreme Court's suggestion that the
public is protected by the sixth amendment.4 6 Nevertheless, the
court stated that "[t]he Supreme Court has never held that the first or
sixth amendments create an absolute right of access to every court
proceeding."4 7
The Jerome court rejected petitioner's constitutional challenges
to the closure order and ruled that the exclusion of the press from the
pretrial hearing did not amount to the prior restraint limitation in
Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart.4 8 The court found that
prohibitions against prior restraints focused on protecting the right
to publication and could be distinguished from the asserted right to
a fair trial by an impartial jury, the seating and conduct in the courtroom of spectators and news media repreentatives, the management and sequestration of jurors and
witnesses, and any other matters which the Court may deem appropriate for inclusion in such an order. In such cases it may be appropriate for the court to consult
with representatives of the news media concerning the issuance of such a special
order.
42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 326 (Purdon Supp. 1981).
PA. R. CRIM. PROC. 327 provides:
All court personnel including, among others, court clerks, bailiffs, tipstaffs and court
stenographers are prohibited from disclosing to any person, without authorization by
the court, information relating to a pending criminal case that is not part of the public records of the court. This rule specifically prohibits the divulgence of information
concerning arguments and hearings held in chambers or otherwise outside the presence of the public.
42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 327 (Purdon Supp. 1981).
44. 478 Pa. at 495, 387 A.2d at 430.
45. Id at 494 n.ll, 387 A.2d at 430 n.ll.
46. See, e.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); Singer v. United States, 380 U.S.
24 (1964).
47. 478 Pa. at 502, 387 A.2d at 434.
48. See notes 22-24 and accompanying text supra.

access.49

Although the Jerome court did not find a constitutionally guaranteed right to access,5" the court did find that the public interest in
open proceedings was strong enough to warrant protection. Consequently, any limitations on access had to be "carefully drawn"'" in
accord with the following guidelines:
First, the right of access to court proceedings should not be limited
for any reason less than the compelling state obligation to protect
constitutional rights of criminal defendants and the public interest
in the fair, orderly, prompt, and final disposition of criminal proceedings. Second, access should not be limited unless the threat
posed to the protected interest is serious. Third, rules or orders
limiting access should effectively prevent the harms at which they
are aimed. Finally, the rules or orders should
52 limit no more than
is necessary to accomplish the end sought.
The court decided that the Rules provide adequate protection for the
criminal defendant and the public53 and stated that trial courts need
a proper method to deal with extrajudicial publicity that threatens
the fairness of defendant's trial. Prejudicial pretrial publicity encroaches not only on defendant's rights, but also injures the Commonwealth and the public in general.5 4 By providing for the closing
of pretrial hearings, Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure
323(0, 326, and 327 protect defendant's right to an impartial jury. 5
49. See Justice Stewart's opinion in Gannett Co. v Depasquale, 443 U.S. at 393 n.25 and
28 SYRACUSE L. REV., supra note 20, at 881-88. But see Gannett Co. v. Depasquale, 55 App.
Div. 2d 107, 389 N.Y.S.2d 719 (1976), modified, 43 N.Y.2d 370, 372 N.E.2d 544, 401 N.Y.S.2d
756 (1977). For a discussion of the position that the purposes and effects of closure orders and
prior restraints are similar and that the two concepts should be treated alike, see Fenner &
Koley, The Rights of the Press and the Closed Court Criminal Proceeding, 57 NEaB. L. REV. 442,
462-75 (1978); Comment, The Rights of/the Public and the Press to Gather Information, 87
HARV. L. REV. 1505, 1517 (1974); Note, The Free Press-Fair Trial Dilemma: New Dimensions
in a Continuing Struggle, 6 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1013, 1031 (1977-78).
50. The petitioners inJerome asserted that a right to access was guaranteed by the Pennsylvania Constitution, but Justice Roberts' opinion rejected this contention without discussion.
Petitioners argument was based on article I, section 11, which states that "[a]ll courts shall be
open." The same assertion was made in the Hayes case. See notes 72-81 and accompanying
text infra.
51. 478 Pa. at 503, 387 A.2d at 434.
52. Id at 503-04, 387 A.2d at 434-35.
53. In his discussion of the sufficiency of protection offered by the Rules, Justice Roberts
defines the public interest as fair and prompt administration of justice and the criminal process. In contrast, other courts consider not only the public interest in fair judicial administration, but whether limitations on access infringe on rights to free press and speech. See, e.g.,
Gannett Co. v. Depasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979); United States v. Cianfrani, 573 F.2d 835 (3d
Cir. 1978); United States ex rel. Bennett v. Rundle, 419 F.2d 599 (3d Cir. 1969). State ex rel.
Dayton Newspapers, Inc. v. Phillips, 46 Ohio St. 2d 457, 351 N.E.2d 127 (1976).
For example, in Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976), the Supreme
Court struck down prior restraint orders not because they infringed on the public's interest in
fair judicial administration, but because they imposed unconstitutional restrictions on the right
to speech and free press. See notes 22-24 and accompanying text supra.
For a criticism of the Jerome court's narrow definition of public interest, see 25 WAYNE L.
REV., supra note 10, at 898.
54. 458 Pa. at 507, 387 A.2d at 436.
55. Id See note 43 supra.

Moreover, by providing that only defendant may request the closing, 56 the Rules protect defendant's right to an open trial and prevent
from becoming an unconstitutional device for the
closure orders
57
prosecution.

The Rules protect the public's interest in fair judicial administration since they "promote the speedy and effective enforcement of
the criminal laws, ensure swift convictions by deterring crime, and
avoid unnecessary expenditures of public funds and judicial resources." 5' 8 By imposing a limitation on access to only the pretrial
hearing, the Rules prevent the harm of adverse pretrial publicity but
do not restrict access more than is necessary to prevent the dissemination of extrajudicial information. Thus, the Court found that the
Rules conform with the Jerome guidelines because they carefully
draw limitations on public access.
Finally, the Jerome decision states that alternatives to closure59
are ineffective since they do not eliminate, but merely minimize the
effects of prejudicial disclosure.6" Thus, the Pennsylvania Rules of
Criminal Procedure, in providing for the closure of hearings, "are
effective means of reducing premature prejudicial disclothe most
61
sure."
In Commonwealth v. Hayes,62 however, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court decided that if the accused's right to a fair trial can
be adequately protected by some other procedural device, that device must be employed and the hearing cannot be closed to the public. The Court found that impaneling the jury before the hearing
and sequestering them would avoid any threat of prejudicial public63

ity.

Justice Nix's opinion 64 reevaluates the Jerome decision in light
56. See note 3 supra.
57. See United States ex rel Bennett v. Rundle, 419 F.2d 599 (3d Cir. 1969) (court's sua
sponte closing of suppression hearing violated defendant's right to a public trial).
58. 458 Pa. at 507, 387 A.2d at 436-37.
59. See notes 50-52 and accompanying text supra.
60. 458 Pa. at 511, 387 A.2d at 438-39. The alternatives include voir dire of potential
jurors, continuances, sequestration, cautionary instructions, and change of venue. For the
view that exclusion orders should be an alternative of last resort, see 28 SYRACUSE L. REV.,
supra note 20, at 912-20.
61. 458 Pa. at 512, 387 A.2d at 439.
62. 489 Pa. 419, 414 A.2d 318 (1980).
63. Justice Nix's opinion emphasizes that Hayes' counsel admitted at oral argument that
sequestration would fully protect defendant's fair trial rights. Equally important, the suppression hearing was scheduled immediately prior to trial, thus avoiding problems of an "unduly
burdensome, costly or inconvenient" sequestration. Id at 430, 414 A.2d at 324. The holding
could be construed narrowly to permit closure even when alternatives are available, if the
alternative procedure is unduly burdensome.
64. Justice Nix concluded that closure of a pretrial proceeding cannot be ordered if an
alternative procedure is available. The concurring opinions of Justice Larsen and Flaherty,
however, view closure orders as per se invalid because they violate article I, § 11 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, which provides that "[all Courts shall be open." The concurring opinions agree that available alternative devices should be used to protect defendant's right to a

of Gannett v. DePasquale.65 Review of the Gannett decision allows a
broader consideration of the claim for an independent constitutional
right of access than the flat rejection offered in Jerome.66 Looking to
Gannett for guidance, Justice Nix observed that "[a]lthough five
members of the [Gannett] Court rejected the claim that the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments conferred upon the public a right of access,
. . a majority of the Court did, however, conclude the public right
to access was constitutionally guaranteed. ' 67 Despite this observation, a majority of the United States Supreme Court has failed to
express a definite view on the first amendment's impact. Because of
the Supreme Court's silence on the first amendment question and its
diversity of views on the sixth amendment, 68 if the court were to focus its inquiry upon "whether the various interests reached constitutional proportions, Gannett would provide little guidance."69
Nonetheless, all members of the Supreme Court agree that any limitation on access must be narrowly drawn.7 ° Thus, Justice Nix concluded that "all of the views expressed by the members of the
Gannett court would have no serious disagreement with a requirement that the alternative procedure should be opted for in preference
to closure."'"
*

fair trial. They do not agree that closure is proper whenever alternative devices are unavailable or are available but unduly burdensome.
Justice Kauffman's concurring opinion recognized that a right of access is guaranteed by
the Pennsylvania Constitution, but did not agree that the right is absolute. Justice Kauffman is
not in complete concurrence with Justice Nix since Kauffman advocates the use of a stricter
standard at the trial level. See note 79 infra
65. Justice Roberts, author of the Jerome decision, wrote a strong dissent in Hayes, in
which he rejected the contention that the Gannett decision demanded a reevaluation of Jerome. Roberts' opinion maintained that Jerome disposed of the issue. In Jerome, the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure survived a constitutional attack and were found to
protect all the interests and rights involved. Under this approach, since closure orders issued
pursuant to the Rules do not deny petitioners any clear right, extraordinary jurisdiction cannot
be invoked and the petitions in Hayes should be dismissed as they were in Jerome.. Moreover,
Justice Roberts did not consider the guidelines established in Jerome to be more restrictive
than the standard used in Gannett. See note 37 and accompanying text supra. Since the
United States Supreme Court upheld the closure in Gannett, Justice Roberts found that the
concurring justices took the unprecedented step of reevaluating a decision because the
Supreme Court found them to be correct. See 489 Pa. at 458-63, 414 A.2d at 338-40.
66. See notes 46-47 & 53-54 and accompanying text supra.
67. 489 Pa. at 424, 414 A.2d at 320. Justice Nix based this statement on the four dissenters' opinion in Gannett, which found a right of access in the sixth amendment and Justice
Powell's concurring opinion, which held that the right was guaranteed by the first amendment.
68. The Hayes court's difficulty in eliciting a clear interpretation and definite standard
from the Gannett decision is indicative of the confusion that currently marks this area of the
law. For criticism of Gannett, including an examination of the Supreme Court's unprecedented extrajudicial statements concerning Gannett, see Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term,
93 HARV. L. REV. 60 (1979). See generally Note, ConstitutionalLaw-Free Press/FairTrialPretrialSuppression HearingMay Be Closed in Order to Preserve Defendant'sRight to a Fair
Trial, 24 VILL. L. REV. 107 (1978).
69. 489 Pa. at 424, 414 A.2d at 320.
70. Id at 426, 414 A.2d at 323. Furthermore, Justice Nix points out that "[e]ven if we
interpret Gannett as establishing that the public right of access is constitutionally guaranteed,
nevertheless,. . . it is not an absolute, unqualified right." Id at 425, 414 A.2d at 321.
71. Id at 426, 414 A.2d at 321. The Court's discussion of Gannett and the Pennsylvania

In addition, the Hayes court addressed whether article 1, section
11 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, providing that "[a]ll Courts
shall be open,"72 imparts to the Commonwealth a heightened responsibility to protect the public's right to judicial access.7 3 In rejecting this contention, the court focused on its prior holdings, which
construed the phrase to provide a right to legal remedies, but not a
right of access to judicial proceedings.7 4 Furthermore, the Hayes
court concluded that the "open court" provision was primarily
designed for the protection of the accused and that the accused may
waive the right to a public proceeding. Consequently, article 1, section 11 does not grant the public an absolute right of access to criminal proceedings.7"
After a review of the state and federal constitutions, the Hayes
court concluded that the public right of access, although not absolute, was significant enough to proscribe the use of closure orders
when the defendant's right to a fair trial could be adequately protected by available alternative procedural devices. The opinion
stated that this result is "virtually compelled" 7 6 by the decision in
Jerome. The Hayes court applied the closure order guidelines established in Jerome77 and posited that a denial of public access is unjustified when the risks of prejudicial publicity are alleviated by the use
of alternative procedures.7 8 Consequently, in accordance with both
Constitution marks a shift in analysis by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Previously, the
court defined the public interest as an interest in fair judicial administration, a definition reflected in Jerome. Under Hayes, the court views the interest as a separate right to access that
may be asserted independently from the public's concern for a fair judicial process. Consequently, Hayes departs from Jerome by rejecting the underlying premise that the public interest is adequately protected if all interests are directed toward preserving a fair trial.
Furthermore, Justice Kauffman, in Hayes, agrees with Justice Nix that Jerome must be reconsidered in light of Gannett. See 489 Pa. at 457 n.20, 414 A.2d at 337 n.20.
72. PA. CONST. art 1, § 11.
73. In Jerome, this same argument was rejected without discussion. That the Hayes
court discusses the issue is indicative of the Court's departure from the view in Jerome, which
held that the public's interest in open proceedings is limited to its interest in fair judicial administration. See note 71 supra.
74. See, e.g., Parker v. Christian Hospital of Philadelphia, 483 Pa. 106, 394 A.2d 932
(1978); Mayle v. Pennsylvania Department of Highways, 479 Pa. 384, 388 A.2d 709 (1978).
Justice Nix finds that cases discussing article I, section 11 in terms of a public right to access
are primarily concerned with the presence of the public as a safeguard against private or starchamber trials. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Tfinkle, 279 Pa. 564, 124 A. 191 (1924); Commonwealth ex re. Paylor v. Cavell, 185 Pa. Super. 176, 138 A.2d 246, cert. denied, 358 U.S. 854
(1958). But see Commonwealth v. Klinger, 75 D. & C.2d 664 (1976). For a contrary view of
the Framers' intent, see Pierre J., All Courts Shall Be Open, 30 Pirr. L. REv. 362 (1883).
75. The three concurring opinions in Hayes reach a different conclusion than Justice Nix
does concerning article I, section II of the Pennsylvania Constitution. See note 64 supra.
76. 489 Pa. at 428, 414 A.2d at 322.
77. See note 52 and accompanying text supra.
78. Justice Roberts' dissent argues that the Jerome decision demands that the closure
order in Hayes be upheld. See note 65 supra. Justice Nix, however, distinguishes the cases.
The Jerome decision presented a closure order which "was necessary to assure a fair trial,"
whereas the Hayes court was asked to consider the propriety of denying access "where the fair
trial of the accused can be fully protected by a means which does not intrude upon the public

Gannett79 and Jerome, the Hayes court found that due deference
cannot be paid to the public's interest unless a careful drawing includes consideration of available alternatives."0 In Hayes, since the
adverse effects could be adequately curtailed by the alternative procedure of sequestration, petitioner's request for extraordinary relief
was granted and the closure order was reversed. 8 '
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's ruling that the exclusion of
the public and press from a pretrial hearing may not be ordered
when other available procedural devices adequately protect defendant's right to a fair trial significantly influences the public right of
access to the criminal courtrooms of Pennsylvania. Although Justice
Nix stated that the holding is not intended to eliminate the use of
closure orders and that, in appropriate situations, the provisions of
Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 323(f) may still be invoked,8 2 the emphasis in Hayes on the availability of alternative procedures marks a departure from the holding in Jerome,83 and places
access." Under this approach, the Court simply applies the principle announced in Jerome to
the facts in Hayes. 489 Pa. at 428 n.7, 414 A.2d at 322 n.7.
That the result reached in Hayes is compelled by the principle announced in Jerome is
questionable. The Hayes decision is grounded on the availability of sequestration to protect
defendant's right to an impartial jury. The guidelines of Jerome, however, do not require a
consideration of alternative procedures when deciding the appropriateness of closure orders.
Moreover, Jerome takes the position that no other procedural device can eliminate prejudicial
publicity and, therefore, the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure are the only effective
means of protecting defendant's rights. See notes 59-61 and accompanying text supra.
See also Justice Roberts' dissent in Hayes, in which he analyzes the financial and judicial
costs of sequestration and reiterates his Jerome position that any alternatives are inadequate
and should not be considered. 489 Pa. at 475-81, 414 A.2d at 347-50. For the view that sequestration is "potentially the most burdensome of weapons available to the trial court," see Warren & Abell, Free Press-FairTrial: The "Gag Order," A CaliforniaAberration, 45 S.CAL. L.
Rnv. 51, 97 (1972).
79. To support the Court's consideration of alternatives and the conclusion that the
availability of a device proscribes the use of closure, Justice Nix returns to the Gannett decision
and focuses on the concurring opinion of Justice Powell. See notes 38 & 39 and accompanying
text supra. The standard for permissible exclusion of the public proffered by Justice Powell
requires the trial court to consider whether there are alternatives to closure that preserve the
fairness of the trial. Justice Nix observed that the guidelines articulated by Justice Roberts in
Jerome seem to coincide with the standard adopted by Justice Powell in Gannett. Although he
stated that the matter need not be conclusively resolved, the suggestion of a connection between the two standards indicates why Justice Nix maintained that the principals announced
in Jerome controlled the result in Hayes. See 489 Pa. at 430 n.9, 414 A.2d at 323 n.9.
80. Justice Kauffman takes the position that alternatives must be considered when determining the appropriateness of closing a pretrial procedure. Justice Kauffman indicates that
unless the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure are construed to include a consideration
of alternatives, the Rules would be unconstitutional. See id at 458 n.21, 414 A.2d at 338 n.21.
The standard Justice Kauffman adopts is also advanced by Justice Blackmun's dissenting
opinion in Gannett. See notes 40-41 and accompanying text supra.
81. Counsel for Hayes made the argument that the public should be excluded from the
suppression hearing to protect Hayes' right of privacy. Noting that if the argument were carried to its logical conclusion it would require closure of all suppression hearings, Justice Nix
concluded that the right to privacy offered no support for the protection Hayes sought. Furthermore, the privacy right found within the scope of the fourth amendment by the Court in
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), is protected by the exclusionary rule and not by barring
the public from the hearing. 489 Pa. at 431-37, 414 A.2d at 324-27.
82. 489 Pa. at 437, 414 A.2d at 327.
83. See notes 64, 71, 73 & 78 supra.

an added responsibility on the courts of Pennsylvania. A trial judge
confronted with defendant's motion to close a pretrial hearing must
consider whether alternative procedures adequately protect defendant's rights. If it is found that such procedures shield defendant
against the adverse effects of publicity, the motion must be denied.
Hence, under the Hayes approach, fewer courtrooms will be closed
to the public.
Nonetheless, Commonwealth v. Hayes fails to completely resolve
the law of Pennsylvania concerning free press and fair trial in the
context of criminal proceedings. Because of the diversity of views on
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court concerning the proper standard for
closure rulings,8 4 meaningful challenges to closure orders are certain
to continue. Furthermore, since the central issues in Hayes are currently the target of prolific litigation, members of the court may find
it apposite to review their respective positions in light of future pronouncements by the United States Supreme Court.8 5
Commonwealth v. Hayes mandates a consideration of alternalive procedures in ruling on a motion to close a pretrial proceeding.8 6
Future decisions are likely to focus on whether the alternatives adequately prevent prejudicial publicity and whether the procedure is
burdensome on judicial administration. If the Hayes trend continues, it is likely that future closure orders will be denied and Pennsylvania courts will be compelled to resort to increased use of other
available procedures instead of excluding the press and public from
pretrial criminal proceedings.

84. See notes 64, 65, 78 and 79 supra.
85. Such a possibility may already be on the horizon. Shortly after Hayes was decided,
the United States Supreme Court, in Richmond Newspaper Association v. Virginia, 448 U.S.
555 (1980), held for the first time that the public right of access to trials is constitutionally
guaranteed by the first amendment. The Richmond court did not decide, however, whether the
right extends to pretrial proceedings.
86. See note 79 and accompanying text supra.
[Casenote by James G. McLean]

